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THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER REPORTING
AGENCIES ACT: A PROPOSED IMPROVEMENT
ON THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
One measure of a truly free society is the vigor with which
it protects the liberties of its individual citizens. As technology has
advanced in America, it has increasingly encroached on one of
those liberties what I term the right of personal privacy. Modem
information systems, data banks, credit records, mailing list abuses,
electronic snooping, the collection of personal data for one purpose
that may be used for another-all these have left millions of
Americans deeply concerned by the privacy they cherish.
And the time has come, therefore, for a major initiative to de-
fine the nature and extent of the basic rights of privacy and to erect
new safeguards to insure that those rights are respected.
I shall launch such an effort this year at the highest levels of
the Administration, and I look forward again to working with this
Congress and establishing a new set of standards that respect the
legitimate needs of society but that also recognize personal privacy
as a cardinal principle of American liberty.
Richard M. Nixon
1974 State of the Union Message1
President Nixon was unable to keep his promise. His statement,
however, illustrates the general recognition of the danger which the
existence of extensive public and private information systems pose to
the personal privacy of all Americans.' The danger is real and grow-
ing. In the area of consumer information, the twenty-one hundred
members of Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., together have more than
100 million files on American consumers.3 The Retail Credit Com-
pany, the largest single entity in the consumer information field,4 has
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1974, at 20, col. 4.
2. A 1974 Louis Harris poll on American attitudes toward personal information
credit companies showed that, "a majority of 69% said they did not believe that their
right to privacy had been violated by credit bureaus, -but 28% thought that they had
been victims of misleading, damaging or incorrect information stored in credit bureau
files." L.A. Times, July 21, 1974, § 5, at 6, col. 1.
3. Hearings on S. 2360 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1973)
(testimony of John L. Spafford, President, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.) [hereinafter
cited as S. 2360 Hearings].
4. Proxmire, Credit Reports That Invade Privacy, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 14, 1974,
at 20, col. 1.
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46 million files. 5 And the Credit Division of TRW, Inc., a recent but
fast growing entrant in the consumer information industry, has files on
more than 35 million consumers." No doubt these files are often
duplicated, but the total of just these three-over 180 million files-
is nonetheless impressive. It is highly probable, if not certain, that any-
one who has ever applied for credit, a loan, or insurance has a file
someplace.
The information contained in consumers' files can include such
items as current and former addresses, places of employment, records
of loan and credit payments, bank balances, lists of credit cards, lists
of credit accounts at stores, marriages, divorces, property owned, traffic
violations, criminal records, and medical history, as well as comments
by employers, neighbors, friends, associates, and investigators on per-
sonal habits and lifestyle.7 From such information, a rather complete
picture of a consumer's life can be constructed.
For a small fee,8 and the demonstration or allegation9 of a legiti-
mate business need, a report containing this kind of information will
be provided to a person or company. Generally such reports are
requested in connection with the extension of credit, the underwriting
of insurance, or an application for employment. Occasionally, how-
ever, these reports are requested and received for illegitimate pur-
poses.,,
This note is designed to analyze proposed California legislation
which would strengthen existing legal controls over the consumer infor-
mation industry and which would provide for more and better protec-
5. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 61 (testimony of W. Lee Burge, President,
Retail Credit Co.).
6. Id. at 126 (testimony of Ray W. Ybaben, Vice President and Director of Sys-
tems, TRW Credit Data).
7. See Proximire, Credit Reports That Invade Privacy, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 14,
1974, at 20, col. 1.
8. In 1973 the standard report for an insurance company in the Chicago area
cost $5.25. Foer, The Personal Information Market: An Examination of the Scope and
Impact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, uncorrected galley proof reprinted in S. 2360
Hearings, supra note 3, at 695, 740 [hereinafter cited as Foer].
9. CBS News tested the difficulty of getting information from consumer reporting
agencies by setting up a fictitious business and having it request credit reports on certain
individuals from 20 credit bureaus in different parts of the country. Ten of the 20 con-
tacted supplied the requested credit reports, several offered to do so if a contract was
signed, and only two referred the applicant to a local credit bureau, the procedure osten-
sibly required by the industry code. Hearings on H.R. 16340 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
59-61 (1970).
10. For example, in August, 1974, Mel Morgan, Idaho Democratic Party Treas-
urer, admitted having obtained a credit report on Republican congressional candidate
George Hansen through his Pocatello jewelry business. Twin Falls Times-News, Aug.
29, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
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tion of consumers against abuses by this industry. In order to under-
stand fully this proposed legislation, it will first be necessary to discuss
briefly the concepts underlying the issues involved in, as well as the
historical background of, the proposed legislation. These introductory
sections will be followed by the main section of the note which will
compare and contrast the proposed California legislation with the pri-
mary existing law in this area, the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act."'
The note will conclude with some additional proposals which would
provide further consumer protections and which might be considered
for inclusion in the proposed California legislation.
Underlying Concepts
Both the interest of the individual consumer in his privacy and the
interest of the creditor, insurance underwriter, and employer in receiv-
ing information about the consumer are legitimate, and the policy dis-
putes surrounding reporting systems are a reflection of the balancing
of these interests.
Due to the mobility of the population and the large size of many
institutions with which consumers deal, credit granting, insurance
underwriting, and hiring are often depersonalized. A consumer infor-
mation system is needed, therefore, to permit these institutions to
differentiate between good and bad credit risks, safe and unsafe
drivers, and reliable and unreliable potential employees. Without such
a system, the decision to extend credit or to underwrite an insurance
policy would have to be made in a vacuum. As a result, the costs of
credit and insurance would inevitably rise to cover the increased losses
from bad credit risks and unsafe drivers. Thus, a good consumer infor-
mation system benefits the good credit risk, the safe driver, and the reli-
able employee by keeping the costs of credit and insurance lower and
by making more jobs available for such persons while increasing the
costs or denying these opportunities to poor credit risks, unsafe drivers
and unreliable employees. Inevitably, each additional item of informa-
tion collected impinges on the subjects' personal privacy, and this costs
the consumer as well, although in ways that cannot be easily calculated
or quantified. In the words of a 1973 report of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, "[t]here is a widespread belief that per-
sonal privacy is essential to our well-being-physically, psychologically,
socially, and morally."'" The interests calling for more information and
for more privacy are thus competitive, and the one can be advanced
only at the expense of the other.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1970).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF HEW PUB. No. (OS) 73-94, REcoRDs, COMUTRS AND TH
RIGHTnS OF CITIZENS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMmIrER ON AurO-
MATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
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Consumer information is only valuable if it is accurate. Indeed,
inaccurate information is worse than no information, and the advantages
of an information system to the consumer in the form of lower costs
for credit and insurance are lost if the information is inaccurate. How-
ever, obtaining 100 percent accurate information would be very expen-
sive, if not impossible. As the costs of collecting consumer information
are included in the cost of credit and insurance, the consumer has a
financial interest in keeping down the cost of collecting this informa-
tion. But the lower the cost of obtaining information, the higher the
error rate,13 and it is when errors occur that individual consumers are
damaged or at least inconvenienced. Again, then, there are competing
interests: on the one hand, there is the interest of collectors and users
of information and consumers in general in keeping down the cost of
information collection; on the other, there is each individual con-
sumer's interest in having accurate information reported.
In addition to these various competing interests consideration must
be given to an individual's minimum rights, regardless of economic cost,
vis-h-vis entities which collect and disseminate information about him.
The HEW Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems recommended in its 1973 Report the enactment into law
of a "Code of Fair Information Practice" consisting of the following five
basic principles:
. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose
very existence is secret.
. There must be a way for an individual to find out what informa-
tion about him is in a record and how it is used.
. There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or
made available for other purposes without his consent.
. There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him.
. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of
the data for their intended use and must take precautions to pre-
vent misuse of the data.' 4
These three underlying concepts-the competition between the
right of privacy and the need for information, the competition between
the cost of collecting the information and the need for accuracy, and
the minimum rights of each individual consumer-form the nucleus of
the debate of whether to expand consumer protection against the con-
sumer information industry.
13. This is a logical proposition. Insuring accurate information requires checking
information and sources carefully and more than once. The more the information is
checked and verified, the more expensive the operation will be in employee time.
14. HEW REPORT, supra note 12, at xx-xxi.
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Historical Background
Prior to 1971, the consumer information industry was largely un-
regulated. 15 The only legal tools available to the abused consumer
were common law suits in negligence, defamation, and invasion of
privacy. Congressional interest in the consumer information industry
and the whole subject of personal information systems was aroused by
a proposal in 1965 to centralize the extensive United States government
files into a single Federal Data Bank.' In light of this congressional
interest, the consumer information industry recognized that some sort
of government regulation was inevitable. It therefore decided to co-
operate with, rather than to resist, the government, in the hope of get-
ting a relatively favorable bill passed.17  The prime mover in the Con-
gress was Senator William Proxmire, and the legislation which resulted
was a product of bargaining between the senator and his staff on one
side and the consumer information industry on the other.'8 The
resultant legislation is known as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FC-
RA). It became effective on April 25, 1971.11
Numerous articles were written on the FCRA following its enact-
ment, and the reception was generally favorable.20 It could not have
been otherwise, for the FCRA gave consumers protections which they
had never had before. Yet, the inadequacies of the act did not go un-
recognized, and many commentators suggested improvements.' The
general consensus was that the act was an important first step.
As the consumer information industry participated in the prepara-
tion of this legislation, it was willing and prepared to live with it.22 One
commentator summarized his informal survey of consumer reporting
agencies and users of consumer data as follows:
For the most part, the representatives of business, banks, and credit
bureaus with whom the author has spoken have dismissed the im-
15. McNamara, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: A Legislative Overview, 22 J.
PuB. L. 67, 71-72 (1973).
16. Id. at 72-73.
17. Denney, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 88 BANKING LJ. 579, 583 (1971).
18. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1970).
20. See, e.g., Koon, Translating The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 48 DENVER LJ.
51 (1971); Note, An Analysis of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 23 BAYLo.R L. REv.
616 (1971); Comment, Protecting Consumers From Arbitrary, Erroneous, And Mali-
cious Credit Information, 4 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 403 (1971); Comment, The Impact of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 50 N.C.L. REv. 852 (1972).
21. See, e.g., Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 23 MAwE L. REv. 253 (1971);
Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 819 (1972); Note, Consumer
Protection: Regulation and Liability of the Credit Reporting Industry, 47 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 1291 (1972); Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550
(1972).
22. Denney, Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 88 BANKING LJ. 579, 588 (1971).
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pact of the FCRA on their operations as being negligible. While
businesses regulated by the FCRA have initiated procedures to in-
sure their compliance with the Act, these businesses did not
experience any rise in costs that could be directly attributed to the
FCRA. They ascribe the negligible impact of the FCRA to a min-
imal percentage of complaints based on alleged errors in credit re-
ports. 23
The FCRA was a compromise bill, and it was inevitable that those
interested in stronger legal control of the consumer information industry
and more protection for consumers would eventually attempt to
strenghten the FCRA by amendment. This was the intent of Senator
Proxmire when he introduced Senate Bill 2360 (a bill to amend the
FCRA) on August 3, 1973.24 The Federal Trade Commission staff,
after two years of responsibility for enforcing the FCRA,25 agreed that
the act needed to be strengthened. -0
Senator Proxmire, as Chairman of the Consumer Credit Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, held five days of hearings on the proposed amendments in
October of 1973 and developed an extensive record in favor of and
in opposition to the amendments. Nevertheless, the subcommittee
decided to table any further consideration of the amendments on
November 27, 1973, by a vote of four to two.2 8 Despite this un-
favorable action, Senator Proxmire held one additional day of hearings
on the FCRA on February 5, 1974.2"
At the same time that the Proxmire bill to amend the FCRA was
being tabled in committee, the California legislature was considering
bills to increase consumer protection in the credit reporting area at the
state level.3 0 Interest centered initially on Assembly Bill 800, which
was introduced on March 15, 1973, by Democratic Assemblyman
23. Martinez, A Guide To The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 18:8 PRAc. LAw. 79,
89 (1972).
24. 119 Cong. Rec. 15604-06 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1973).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (1970).
26. Feldman, The Fair Credit Reporitng Act-From The Regulators Vantage
Point, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 459, 470, 485 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Feldman].
27. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3.
28. Feldman, supra note 26, at 487.
29. Hearings On Amending The Fair Credit Reporting Act Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as FCRA Hearings].
30. California enacted legislation in 1970 to regulate the consumer information in-
dustry. Consumer Credit Reporting Act, ch. 1348, § 1, [1970] Cal. Stat. 2512, codified
in CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1750-57 (West 1973). This law was effectively superseded by
the more extensive controls and protection for consumers contained in the FCRA. The
proposed CRAA contains a provisions for its repeal. For background on the Consumer
Credit Reporting Act, see Comment, Protection of Consumer Interests and the Credit
Rating Industry, 2 PAc. LJ. 635 (1971).
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Harvey Johnson and which passed the assembly on September 10,
1973, by a vote of seventy to zero.31 This bill had most of its
pro-consumer aspects deleted in committee, and the form in which it
passed the assembly was acceptable to the consumer information
industry.12  It was not acceptable, however, to the State Department
of Consumer Affairs, the principal advocate in Sacramento for pro-con-
sumer legislation. The staff of the Consumer Affairs Department pro-
posed twenty-three amendments to A.B. 800, only five of which
were eventually accepted by the consumer information industry.33 As
negotiations through the spring of 1974 did not result in a compromise
on A.B. 800" (which eventually was defeated in the Senate Judiciary
Committee on August 20, 1974'"), the Consumer Affairs Department
drafted its own bill, which Republican Assemblyman Jerry Lewis intro-
duced on June 20, 1974, as A.B. 4494.36 This bill, which is known
as the Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (CRAA) and which is
strongly pro-consumer, was approved by the Assembly Finance Com-
mittee on August 15, 1974, by a vote of twelve to three and passed
the assembly on August 19, 1974 by a majority of sixty-five to two.3 7
The bill was tabled in the Senate Committee on Business and Profes-
sions on August 21, 1974,18 as there was insufficient time to consider
it before the session ended on August 30.11
The CRAA has been reintroduced into the current session of the
legislature with essentially the same wording as A.B. 4494.40 As it
goes through the legislative process, modifications, deletions and addi-
tions will undoubtedly be made. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to con-
sider the provisions of the proposed act as they appeared in A.B. 4494:
since these provisions were approved by one branch of the legislature,
they can serve both as a useful guide to the upcoming legislative debate
and as a preview of what is likely to be, at least in part, the new law
of California in the area of consumer information reporting.
31. ASSEMBLY WEEKLY HISTORY, 1973-74 Reg. Sess., Oct. 2, 1974, pt. 1, at 225.
32. L.A. Times, Sept. 1, 1974, § V, at 1, col. 1, & at 5, col. 1.
33. id. at 5, col. 3.
34. Id.
35. ASSEMBLY WEEKLY HISTORY, 1973-74 Reg. Sess., Oct. 2, 1974, pt. 1, at 225.
36. Id., pt. 6, at 1429.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Interview with Cristina L. Rose, Deputy Chief, Division of Consumer Serv-
ices, Cal. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, in Sacramento, Oct. 18, 1974.
40. The CRAA has been divided into two parts and presented to the California
Legislature's 1975-1976 Regular Session as A.B. 600 and A.B. 601. This was presum-
ably done in the interest of clarity, for A.B. 600 covers consumer credit reports and A.B.
601 investigative consumer reports. For an explanation of these terms, see text accom-
panying notes 46, 48 infra.
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The Proposed Consumer Reporting Agencies Act
It is impossible to understand the meaning and significance of the
proposed Consumer Reporting Agencies Act without being aware of
the provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The CRAA builds
upon the FCRA, and many of its provisions are the same as those of
the Federal Act, particularly as regards its scope and application.
Furthermore, the FCRA is the law now in force in California, and the
CRAA would change the law to the extent that its provisions go beyond
those of the FCRA. Therefore, much of the discussion which follows
will involve a description of FCRA provisions in order to show how the
CRAA differs.41  Also, the genesis of many of the CRAA's proposed
changes is Senator Proxmire's proposed 1973 amendments to the
FCRA. Consequently, the record developed by the hearings on that
legislation42 will often be used as a source of reasons for and against
the various changes.
The analysis of the CRAA is divided into five main sections: (1)
purpose of the CRAA, (2) scope and application of the act, (3) addi-
tional consumer rights which it would provide, (4) additional consumer
remedies which it would provide, and (5) expanded control of con-
sumer reporting agencies which it would accomplish. The analysis con-
cludes with a brief discussion of federal supremacy as it relates to the
CRAA. It should be noted at the outset, however, that it was not the
intent of Congress to discourage state action in this area by making fed-
eral law preemptive and that federal law only takes precedence over
state law when the two are inconsistent. 43 As the proposed CRAA is
in no way inconsistent with the FCRA, federal supremacy is not a prob-
lem.44
Purpose
Both the FCRA and the proposed CRAA have the same purpose
and they use the same language to describe it:
It is the purpose of [this Act] to require that consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other in-
formation in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer,
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
41. There are a number of good explications of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
E.g., Feldman, The Fair Credit Reporting Act-Provisions and Problems, 61 ILL. BJ.
314 (1973); Koon, Translating The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 48 DENVER L.J 51
(1971).
42. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1970).
44. See text accompanying notes 166-69 infra.
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utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements
of this [Act]. 45
In broad terms, this purpose is accomplished by requiring that a
consumer be notified when a report has been made on him that has
resulted in an adverse decision on a credit, insurance, or employment
application; that the consumer be told the name and address of the con-
sumer reporting agency which made the report; that he have a right to
learn the contents of the file which the agency has on him; that he have
a right to challenge and correct that information; and that he have a
remedy against the consumer reporting agency and/or user of the
report when he has been injured unjustly by the report.
Scope and Application
The scope and application of the proposed CRAA and the FCRA
are also very similar. Both acts use the same definitions to limit their
applicability, and, with one exception, both contain the same require-
ments for notifying a consumer that a report was requested and used
in making the decision on his application for credit, insurance, or
employment.
A consumer report is defined as one made by a consumer report-
ing agency
bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit
capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or
mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected
in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in estab-
lishing the consumer's eligibility for (1) credit or insurance to be
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, or (2)
employment purposes, or (3) other purposes authorized under[this Act].4 6
It should be noted that any report made in connection with an applica-
tion for credit or insurance which is not to be used primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes is not covered by either act.
For example, a report that was obtained by an insurance company on
an executive in connection with an application made by his employer
for "key man" life insurance, is not covered by the FCRA.4 7
An investigative consumer report is a consumer report where the
information is
obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or
associates of the consumer reported on or with others with whom
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1970); A.B. 4494 § 1 (1974), as amended Aug. 5, 1974
(proposed CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9998(e)) thereinafter cited as A.B. 4494 followed
by proposed CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE section(s)].
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1970); see A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed §
9998.2(c).
47. Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1972).
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he is acquainted or who may have knowledge [about the con-
sumer]. 4 8
A consumer reporting agency
means any person, which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a coopera-
tive nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information
or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties . . .49
It should be noted that these acts only cover information-gathering
activity when it is done by someone other than the person or company
using the information. In other words, information which is gathered
by a user's own investigators is not covered under the above definitions.
Since it is rare for a consumer to know of the existence of his
credit file, the notification provisions of the FCRA and the proposed
CRAA are of critical importance. Both acts provide that whenever
credit, insurance, or employment is denied, or the charge for credit or
insurance is increased, wholly or in part because of information con-
tained in a consumer report, the user of the consumer report must so
inform the consumer and supply him with the name and address of the
consumer reporting agency which did the report.5"
Both acts also provide that a user must inform the consumer if he
has used information about the consumer received from a source other
than a consumer reporting agency. 51 Such sources include financial
institutions, insurance companies, and employers which supply informa-
tion to others about their own dealings with a particular consumer; the
acts are structured to permit them to report on their own dealings with
consumers without becoming consumer reporting agencies.52
The notification provisions governing information from a source
other than a consumer reporting agency are broader in the CRAA than
in the FCRA. Under the FCRA, if a user of consumer data denies
credit or increases the charge for credit based on information from a
source other than a consumer reporting agency and if the consumer
makes a written request for an explanation within sixty days of learning
of any adverse action, the user must disclose to the consumer within
a reasonable period of time the nature of the information.58 The CRAA
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (1970); see A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed §
9998.2(d).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1970); see A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed §
9998.2(e).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1970); see A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed §
9998.40(a).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b) (1970); see A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed §
9998.2(c).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1970); see A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed §
9998.2(c).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1681re(b) (1970).
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broadens this provision in two ways. 'First it extends the above
notification requirement to insurance companies which deny insurance
or increase insurance costs based on information from a source other
than a consumer reporting agency." Thus, under the CRAA if a user
denies credit or insurance or increases the cost for either based on in-
formation from a source other than a consumer reporting agency, the
user must make disclosure within a reasonable period of time if asked
to do so in writing by the consumer within sixty days of learning of an
adverse action. Secondly, the CRAA broadens the disclosure which
must be made, for under its wording the user must disclose to the con-
sumer the substance as well as the nature of the information received
from this other source.55
Apart from these differences, the scope and application of the two
acts are the same.
Additional Consumer Rights
The FCRA and the proposed CRAA give the consumer certain
rights to learn the contents of his file kept by a consumer reporting
agency and to learn to whom the agency has sent reports about him.
The proposed CRAA expands those rights over those provided by the
FCRA.
The FCRA requires a consumer reporting agency to inform a
properly identified consumer who inquires in person or by telephone
about the nature and substance of the information it has on the
consumer in its files.56  The agency need not, however, disclose any
medical information that it may have on the consumer.5 7 It must also
inform the consumer of the sources of the information, except for the
sources of investigative reports,58 and to whom it has sent reports within
the last two years for employment purposes and within the last six
months for any other purpose.59 The consumer reporting agency may
charge a reasonable fee for disclosing this information unless the
consumer has been denied credit, insurance, or employment within the
last thirty days.60 The consumer has no right to see his file or to handle
it. 6 1
54. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.40(b).
55. Id.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (1) (1970).
57. Id.
58. An "investigative consumer report" is one "obtained through personal inter-
views with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer reported on or with others
with whom he is acquainted." Id. § 1681a(e).
59. Id. § 1681g(a) (3).
60. Id. § 1681j.
61. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CONSUMm BULL. No. 7, KNow YouR rar
UNDER TnE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING Acr (1972).
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The proposed CRAA not only makes it easier for the consumer
to find out what is in his file, but it also deletes the exception for the
nondisclosure of medical information contained in the FCRA.62  The
CRAA permits a consumer to inspect his file visually, 63 to receive a
copy of it in person or by mail 64 along with a written explanation of
the codes used in the file,65 and to do both of these without fee except
for mailing and copying charges. 66 Additionally, the CRAA limits the
amount of identification a consumer must produce before he can
inspect or procure a copy of his file.6 '
In the opinion of FTC Chairman Engman, "[T]he most com-
plained of feature of the FCRA is the disclosure (or lack thereof) by
the consumer reporting agency." 68  The FTC ran a test to determine
the completeness of the disclosures to consumers and,
found that there is often wholesale withholding of information con-
cerning character, reputation, or morals. Since the consumer does
not have the right to examine his own file or receive a copy of the
information, he is unable to question the completeness of the dis-
closure.69
In the words of another FTC official,
The consumer is limited to the passive role of listener. Thus, a
form of "legislatively imposed trust" is the heart of this law. The
adequacy of the disclosure is entirely dependent upon the patience,
honesty and candor of the particular individual employed by the
consumer reporting agency visited by the inquiring consumer.70
Without being able actually to see his file, a consumer can never be
sure that he has learned everything, and even if the consumer reporting
agency does tell the consumer everything, an element of doubt will
remain with all but the most credulous.
The consumer information industry generally opposes visual in-
spection with the argument that if consumers are allowed to handle
their files, an occasional one might try to seize or destroy his file. 1'
Given the criminal remedies against such a volatile consumer, this
seems a rather weak argument. It is interesting to note that on its own
62. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.10.
63. Id., proposed §§ 9998.10, .22(b).
64. Id., proposed § 9998.22(b) (2).
65. Id., proposed § 9998.22(e).
66. Id., proposed § 9998.22(b).
67. Id., proposed § 9998.22(c).
68. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 658 (statement of Lewis A. Engman, Chair-
man, FTC).
69. Id. at 659.
70. Feldman, The Fair Credit Reporting Act-Provisions and Problems, 61 ILL.
B.J. 314, 318-19 (1973).
71. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 20 (testimony of Robert K. Pinger, Presi-
dent, Credit Bureau of Greater Houston, Inc.).
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initiative, the Retail Credit Company decided to start permitting con-
sumers to inspect their files visually on June 1, 1974.72
The CRAA provision permitting a consumer to receive by mail a
copy of his file along with an explanation of the codes used in it is de-
signed to solve a typical problem faced by a consumer who has moved
from one city to another and is denied credit. Since the file upon
which the credit denial is made is located in the city of his former resi-
dence, if a copy by mail were unavailable, the consumer would either
have to make a trip to this city or to request disclosure by telephone,
incurring charges for long distance calls. 73  Faced with these options,
many consumers would simply not pursue the issue further. Permitting
a consumer to get a copy of his file by mail would thus be of great bene-
fit to consumers. Once a copy of the file is sent by mail, then an ac-
companying disclosure of the codes used in the file is essential to make
the file understandable to the consumer.
The consumer information industry raises three objections to this
proposal: (1) the file may be lost in the mail, resulting in unauthorized
disclosures; 74 (2) the consumer may use his copy of the file to get
credit, thus denying legitimate business to the consumer reporting
agency; 75 and (3) the revelation of subscriber codes to consumers
could lead to unauthorized requests for consumer reports. 76
The CRAA deals with the first objection by relieving the con-
sumer reporting agency of any liability from unauthorized disclosures
due to a consumer report's being lost in the mail.17 The second objec-
tion seems somewhat farfetched. It presupposes that someone granting
credit will accept a copy of a consumer's credit rating from the consu-
mer himself, with the attendant risk of tampering, rather than paying
the minimal charge for getting one directly from an agency.78 One
commentator recognized the third objection as having merit and recom-
mended that consumer reporting agencies whose information is coded,
primarily credit bureaus, be exempted from a similar provision in the
proposed Proxmire amendments.79 The problem, however, is one only
of subscriber codes, for no one should particularly care about the codes
used to describe the information in the file. It would seem that the
subscriber codes could easily 'be deleted from the file copy mailed to
the consumer and that the information on users who have recently re-
72. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1974, at 58, col. 2.
73. Feldman, supra note 26, at 470-71.
74. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 92 (testimony of W. Lee Burge).
75. Id. at 68; Foer, supra note 8, at 720.
76. Id. at 40 (testimony of John L. Spafford).
77. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.22(b) (2).
78. Foer, supra note 8, at 720.
79. Id. at 720-21.
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quested the file could be supplied to the consumer in a covering letter
or in a manner other than by code.
The argument in favor of deleting the disclosure fee provision of
the FCRA is essentially one of fairness. In the words of an FTC of-
ficial, "By any reasonable standard of fairness, the consumer has a right
to know exactly what information is being collected and sold about
him."80 This provision was not included in Senator Proxmire's amend-
ments, and so the industry spokesman at those hearings did not testify
directly on this point. The objection would certainly be one of cost,
however, for, as was pointed out at the congressional hearings, many
credit bureaus are small and operate on small profit margins."' It is
no doubt true that disclosures without fee (except for copying, mailing,
and telephone charges) would add slightly to the operating costs of con-
sumer reporting agencies, but the amount is likely to be small. This
conclusion is based on the assumption that few consumers request dis-
closure now without first having been denied credit, insurance, or
employment, in which case the disclosure must now be without fee
under the FCRA.
Furthermore, the value of a file is in part a function of its
accuracy, and a consumer-inspected file, which the consumer certifies
as accurate, must be more valuable than an uninspected one. Since
a consumer reporting agency can note in the file that such an inspection
was made, it would seem to be getting something of value out of the
transaction. Moreover, a consumer who has inspected his file would
seem to be precluded from later asserting that the inspected informa-
tion was inaccurate.
The purpose of delineating and limiting, within the CRAA, the
type of identification that a consumer must produce to see his file is
to prevent a consumer reporting agency from using the request for dis-
closure to procure additional information on the consumer. One com-
mentator described the extended questionnaire which he was required
to answer for identification purposes after he had requested disclosure
under the FCRA.82 In addition to requesting a rather detailed
personal history, the form concluded with an authorization whereby the
consumer was to give permission to the agency to procure any records
on the consumer from any business, organization, or professional
person.88 The use of such a form must intimidate most consumers and
clearly violates the spirit of the FCRA. This practice would not be pos-
sible under the CRAA.
80. Feldman, supra note 26, at 475 (emphasis in original).
81. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 38-39 (testimony of John L. Spafford).
82. Id. at 675-76 (testimony of Albert A. Foer). The form is reprinted in id.
at 693-94.
83. Id.
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The exclusion of medical information from the disclosure required
by the FCRA was added by the House-Senate Conference out of fear
that a consumer reporting agency might disclose to a consumer medical
information of a traumatic nature of which the consumer was unaware . 4
The consumer information industry wishes to retain this exclusion out
of concern that physicians will no longer be candid in reporting medi-
cal information if the confidentiality of the medical reports cannot be
assured, i.e., if it is possible the consumer may see the report.8" Ad-
vocates of disclosure argue that since medical information is often the
most personal and potentially the most damaging in the report, it should
therefore be available for verification by the consumer.8 6 The HEW
report on personal data systems found this exclusion disturbing and
recommended its deletion. It seems incongruous for consumer report-
ing agencies, finance companies, insurance companies, and potential
employers to be able to see information of a highly personal nature about
a consumer which the consumer is unable to see or to verify and of
whose very existence he may be unaware.
The Proxmire amendments to the FCRA would have permitted
disclosure to a licensed physician of the consumer's choice.88 The
CRAA goes one step beyond this by simply deleting any reference to
medical information, with the result that any such information in the
consumer's file must be disclosed directly to him. 9 The argument for
the intermediary step proposed by the Proxmire amendments is that
there are rare instances when a consumer's physician does not wish the
consumer to know some traumatic information. However, this ap-
proach puts an unnecessary financial burden on the vast majority of
consumers not in this situation, for they must pay to have a physician
receive and read the report. On balance, the California solution seems
more equitable.
Additional Consumer Remedies
There are three types of remedies available to a consumer who
discovers inaccurate or erroneous information in his file or who learns
that the file of someone else has been provided to a user inadvertently.
They are (1) preliminary remedies short of filing suit, (2) civil causes
of action legislatively created, and (3) common law causes of action
in defamation and invasion of privacy. In all three areas, the proposed
CRAA would expand the available consumer remedies.
84. Id. at 672.
85. Id. at 89 (testimony of W. Lee Burge).
86. Id. at 432-33 (testimony of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Massachusetts).
87. HEW REPORT, supra note 12, at 70.
88. S. 2360, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(2), reprinted in S. 2360 Hearings, supra note
3, at 5.
89. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.10(a).
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In order to put into better focus the additional remedies contained
in the CRAA, it is worthwhile to consider first what appears to be the
central issue in the debate between the consumer information industry
and consumer advocates, namely, the degree of accuracy of the infor-
mation now collected and distributed by consumer reporting agencies.
Apart from the question of fairness, the need for additional legal
remedies against consumer reporting agencies must reflect the error
rate in consumer reports. If errors are infrequent, then the need for
additional consumer remedies is less pressing.
At the present time there is little conclusive data on the number
of errors in consumer reports. On March 9, 1973, the FTC filed a
complaint against Retail Credit alleging numerous violations of the
FCRA,90 and the record developed by this proceeding should provide
much data on this point. 1  The one item of hard information of which
the author is aware is an admission made by Ray Ybaben of TRW
Credit Data at the National Computer Conference held in Chicago in
May 1974. Participating in a panel on privacy, Mr. Ybaben said that
consumer inquiries at TRW Credit Data jumped from 2,000 to 200,000
per year after the passage of the FCRA, but estimated that even at
that high figure only 5 percent of the consumers denied credit
contacted TRW to find out why.92 The most interesting statement of
Mr. Ybaben, however, was his claim that of the 200,000 annual
inquiries, "only one third" resulted in the correction of an error. 3 This
is a rather startling admission.
The consumer information industry points to the small number of
consumer complaints as indicative of the high level of accuracy of con-
sumer reports and of full compliance with the FCRA.94 FTC records
indicate a total of about 21,000 telephone and written complaints under
the FCRA between 1971 and August 1974, not a large number nation-
wide.95
On the other side, consumer advocates point to the data collection
methods of consumer reporting agencies as an indication that the error
rate must be significant. The two elements of these methods which,
90. Retail Credit Co., Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f 20,268
(FTC 1973).
91. The case is in the advanced pretrial stage and the judge has issued a broad
protective order, so there is little as yet on the public record. Telephone conversation
with Gerald Wright, FTC Office Region IX, San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 16, 1975.
92. COMPUTERWORLD (NEwswEEKLY FOR THE COMPUTER CoMMuNrrY), May 15,
1974, at 6, col. 1.
93. Id. (quotation marks in original).
94. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 35, 46 (testimony of John L. Spafford).
95. Letter from Sheldon Feldman, Ass't Director for Special Statutes, FTC, to
Christine D. Rose, Deputy Chief, Consumer Services Division, Cal. Dep't of Consumer
Affairs, Aug. 23, 1974.
1234 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
it is alleged, lead to high error rates are the number of consumer re-
ports which an agency employee must complete each working day and
the strong expectation by his superiors that he discover a certain per-
centage of adverse information.
An investigator for a consumer reporting agency must complete
anywhere from eighteen to twenty reports a day, for he is generally
paid on a piecework basis and this number is necessary for him to make
an adequate living.96 But, according to the testimony of a former
employee of Retail Credit, if an investigator were to prepare the reports
by the company manual, he could not maintain an average of even eight
reports a day.97  The economics of the consumer information industry
are such that a large daily output by each employee is necessary since
the charge per report is generally low. For example, the fee for each
report requested by insurance companies in the Chicago area is only
$5.25.98 As a result of this time and money pressure, former employ-
ees of Retail Credit alleged that it is a common practice for investigators
to "zing" reports by fabricating sources, not verifying adverse informa-
tion from two sources, and basing reports on previous ones. 99
The pressure to come up with adverse information is undis-
puted.100 Consumer advocates call this a quota system, and the con-
sumer information industry terms it quality control. Elaborate records
are maintained by Retail Credit on the amount of "declinable"
and "protective" information generated. 10 1 The former is information
which will result in a denial of credit, insurance, or employment, and
the latter is information which will result in higher rates for credit or
insurance. Retail Credit labels this recordkeeping practice quality con-
trol, rather than a quota system. The following interchange between
Senator Proxmire and W. Lee Burge, President of Retail Credit,
illustrates the differing viewpoints.
Mr. Burge. We have never had a quota system for protective
information, Senator, and we have rather patiently and deliberately
explained this fact time and again both to this committee and the
committee in the House.
We know from our experience that if a man does a satisfactory
job of investigation a certain amount of information will be
developed from his investigations, and we are able on the basis of
our experience, to determine what the parameters of satisfactory
performance are, but we have never had a quote [sic] system.
96. FCRA Hearings, supra note 29, at 4 (testimony of William F. Boaz).
97. Id.; id. at 6 (testimony of Dick Riley).
98. Foer, supra note 8, at 740.
99. FCRA Hearings, supra note 29, at 6 (testimony of Dick Riley); id. at 10
(testimony of Mark S. Brodie); jd. at 12-13 (testimony of Len 0. Holloway).
100. See text accompanying note 102 infra.
101. FCRA Hearings, supra note 29, at 5 (testimony of Dick Riley).
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Senator Proxmire. One of the criteria by which your inspec-
tors are judged is the statement in your manual in which you say
in part, "A large number of CNL, incomplete underwriting infor-
mation consistently low, protective, and declinable information,"
and so forth.
In other words, a consistently low protective and declinable
information suggests at -least an implicit quota.
Mr. Burge. No, sir; it does not; and it is rather explicitly
detailed to all our people that we do not have a quota system.
Senator Proxmire. Let me read from a letter of November
1, 1971, this is from the Northern California Retail Credit Co.,
signed by the regional vice president. It says that, in the market-
ing meeting to discuss the, "State Farm's need to develop more
declinable information in the Northern California region." We
also discussed what would be declinable, and I know we received
considerable information, and so on.
Mr. Burge. You note the absence of any specific figures
there, Senator.
Senator Proxmire. That is right.
Mr. Burge. Therefore, if we had a specific quota, obviously
there would have been quotas in terms of specifics discussed.
May I respond?
Senator Proxmire. Yes; indeed.
Mr. Burge. We actually know from our experience that
people who do a satisfactory investigative job will develop a certain
percentage of information. There are approximately 9 million
alcoholics in the United States. There are approximately 1 million
people who are addicted to drugs. There are 55,000 people a year
who are killed on the highways as a result of accidents. Approxi-
mately half of those were driving under the influence. And if we
sent 5,000 people into the field every day who developed no
information, then it would be startling indeed that we had a lack
of performance to that degree.
Senator Proxmire. Yes; but you go a little further than that.
I have a letter dated December 15 in which you conclude-it is
written by a regional vice president-saying that: "I said it before
and I will say it again: You have done a monumental job in plac-
ing in the upper third grouping in both declinable and protective,"
and so forth.
Mr. Burge. Yes, sir. They show they have developed the
information that is there.10 2
One man's quota is another man's quality control.
Preliminary Remedies
Under the FCRA, if a consumer disputes the completeness or ac-
curacy of any item in his file, and the consumer reporting agency, on
102. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 63 (testimony of W. Lee Burge). Testi-
mony at congressional hearings is not always punctuated properly. The cited portions
are as they appear in the report of the hearings.
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reasonable grounds, decides that this dispute is neither frivolous nor
irrelevant, the agency must reinvestigate the item of information. 0 3 If
upon reinvestigation the information is found to be inaccurate or can
no longer be verified, the agency must correct or delete the item.'04
If the reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer has
the right to place a statement in his file detailing his side of the dis-
pute.'0 5 The consumer's statement or a summary of it must then be
included in any subsequent report. 0 6 The consumer can also request
notification to any potential employer who received a report within the
past two years or to anyone else who received a report within the past
six months of the deletion, change, or statement of dispute. 0 7 How-
ever, if the consumer reporting agency decides that the dispute is
frivolous or irrelevant, then the consumer's preliminary remedies are
at an end.
The proposed CRAA retains the same general procedures as the
FCRA, but closes the loophole in that act by giving the consumer the
right to file a statement to be included in his file even if the consumer
reporting agency determines that the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant
and refuses to reinvestigate. 08 According to an internal memorandum
of the Consumer Affairs Department, this provision was included in the
CRAA
to prevent consumer reporting agencies from simply ignoring dis-
putes . . . . By requiring at least some response to the consumer
and eliminating the possibility of simply ignoring him, it is hoped
that consumer reporting agencies will, when presented with a con-
sumer dispute, more seriously consider the alternative of re-check-
mig the item of information. 10 9
Civil Remedies Under the FCRA and CRAA
Little litigation has been generated by the FCRA. The author
has been unable to find a single reported case where a consumer has
collected damages from a consumer reporting agency or a user for
either negligent or willful noncompliance with the FCRA," 0 although
there have been some out of court settlements."'
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1970).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1681i(b).
106. Id. § 1681i(c).
107. Id. § 1611i(d).
108. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.24.
109. Cal. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, Internal Memorandum from Thomas J. Mac-
Bride, Jr., to Tim Comstock, Deputy Dir., July 18, 1974, at 4.
110. John H. F. Shattuck of the ACLU also knew of no civil damages awarded un-
der the FCRA. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 643.
111. See id. at 23-24.
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In contemplating a suit under the civil liability provisions of the
FCRA, 112 the consumer is faced with two problems. First, the FCRA
establishes as its standard of compliance that consumer reporting
agencies and users adopt and "maintain reasonable procedures.""13
Civil damages are then available to the consumer if he can prove that
there was either willful114 or negligent"15 noncompliance with the act.
Thus, in the more likely case of negligence, the consumer is faced with
what may be described as a double negligence standard of proof." 6
He must show that the consumer reporting agency not only failed to
comply with the FCRA in not maintaining reasonable procedures, but
that it negligently failed to do so. Furthermore, as one commentator
has suggested, the wording of the FCRA may preclude holding a con-
sumer reporting agency vicariously liable for the negligence of its
employees; the burden of defense on a consumer reporting agency
would be simply to prove that its corporate procedures were reasonable,
regardless of the observance or nonobservance of these by individual
employees. 7
The second and more difficult problem which a consumer faces
under the FCRA is that he must be prepared to prove actual damages,
and his recovery will be determined by that proof."l8 Since in most
cases it is difficult to establish actual damages from a denial of credit
or insurance, civil suits are not often a viable alternative. In a 1972
case in the District of Columbia, the court was forced to dismiss the
complaint with prejudice, even though it had found that the consumer
reporting agency had acted negligently, because the consumer could
not show any damages from having been denied a credit card." 9
The proposed CRAA makes civil suits by consumers much easier.
First, it eliminates the double negligence standard of proof. Com-
pliance with the CRAA by consumer reporting agencies and users is
still measured by their maintenance of reasonable procedures, 120 but
they are held liable for straight noncompliance with the act.' 2 ' Thus
if a consumer can point to a specific error made by a consumer report-
ing agency or user in apparent violation of the act, he would then have
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-o (1970).
113. Id. § 1681(b) (adopt), 1681d(c), 1681e, 1681m(c) (maintain).
114. Id. § 1681n.
115. Id. § 1681o.
116. See Note, Panacea or Placebo? Actions For Negligent Noncompliance Under
The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 47 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 1070, 1098-99 (1974).
117. Id. at 1101-03.
118. 15 U.S.C. H9 1681n-o (1970).
119. Miller v. Credit Breau of Washington, D.C. (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972), [1969-
1973 Transfer Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GUmE 91, 99,173.
120. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.20.
121. Id., proposed § 9998.50(a).
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a prima facie case for recovery and the burden would be on the con-
sumer reporting agency or user to defend on the grounds that they
maintained reasonable procedures and that the error was a bona fide
one. To require, as the FCRA does now, that the consumer prove neg-
ligent noncompliance with the act seems to put an unfair burden on
the consumer, especially since it is the consumer reporting agency and
user who have all the information on their compliance procedures.
Second, the CRAA makes consumer suits easier by providing for
recovery of either adtual damages or $300, whichever is greater, if non-
compliance with the act can be shown. 2 2  In addition, as is now
provided by the FCRA, punitive damages are available if it can be
shown that the noncompliance was repeated or willful.12 3  If a con-
sumer's suit is successful, he may also be awarded costs and reasonable
attorney fees. 24 These costs can also be awarded under the FCRA. 25
The consumer is permitted no recovery if the noncompliance resulted
in a more favorable report than would have been the case had the
agency complied with the act.'12  The minimum $300 recovery is not
available to plaintiffs in a class action. Thus, actual damages to the
class must be proven.1 7
The minimum $300 recovery would make civil suits attractive to
consumers which, in turn, would create a strong incentive for consumer
reporting agencies and users to maintain the required reasonable pro-
cedures. An FTC official recommended that such a minimum re-
covery provision be added to the FCRA and credited an analogous
provision in the Truth-In-Lending Act with "promoting a relatively high
degree of compliance [with the Act] and a substantial amount of pri-
vate civil activity."'128
The issue is whether one believes that additional incentives are
necessary. The consumer information industry strenuously objects to
such provisions, pointing out that it would be a license to litigate, that
they would incur great expense defending such suits,' 29 and that the
current law is fair to everyone, for a consumer can recover compensa-
tion to the extent that he has been damaged. 30
There is no doubt, however, that this minimum recovery feature
would be a strong incentive for compliance with the act, for the con-
122. Id., proposed § 9998.50 (a) (1).
123. Id., proposed § 9998.50(b).
124. Id., proposed § 9998.50 (a) (2).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(3).
126. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.50(c).
127. Id., proposed § 9998.50(a)(1).
128. Feldman, supra note 26, at 484.
129. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 48 (testimony of John L. Spafford).
130. Id. at 119 (testimony of W. Lee Burge).
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sumer reporting agencies could no longer rely upon the difficulty of
establishing actual damages as a protection against civil suits.
Common Law Remedies
The FRCA provides that
no consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency,
any user of information, or any person who furnishes information
to a consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed
pursuant to [this Act], except as to false information furnished
with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.1 3 1
This provision effectively makes consumer reporting agencies, users of
consumer reports, and the sources of the information contained in the
consumer reports immune from common law suits, since malice is diffi-
cult to prove. The CRAA contains no similar immunity provision.' 2
A vast majority of the states have given the reports of consumer
reporting agencies a qualified privilege.'3 3 This qualified privilege
means that a consumer reporting agency can communicate defamatory
information about a consumer without being liable to the consumer if
the information is false, as long as the communication was a part of
its regular business operation and was made in good faith and without
malice. 3 4 The result is that malice is an essential element of a cause
of action for defamation in these jurisdictions. Because of this, a
Washington attorney for the Retail Credit Company has argued, "as a
practical matter, since a consumer is free to sue despite [the immunity]
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970).
132. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.52.
133. Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 776, 777 (1953). Georgia and Idaho are two exceptions
to this general rule. See Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886); Pacific Packing
Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 P. 1007 (1914). Neither of these old cases
has been overruled. A federal district court in Georgia recently held that if a Georgia
court were to rule now on the issue of granting a qualified privilege to credit reporting
agencies it would reverse the holding in Johnson v. Bradstreet Co. Hood v. Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The circuit court of appeals reversed,
holding that a Georgia court would reaffirm the Johnson decision. Hood v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1580 (1974).
The Idaho Supreme Court justified its holding in Pacific Packing Co. as follows:
"The only safe and just rule, either in law or morals, is the one that exacts truthfulness
in business as well as elsewhere and places a penalty upon falsehood, making it danger-
ous for a mercantile, commercial or any other agency to sell and traffic falsehood and
misrepresentation about the standing and credit of men or corporations. The company
that goes into the business of selling news or reports about others should assume the
responsibility for its acts and must be sure that it is peddling the truth." 25 Idaho 696,
704, 139 P. 1007, 1010 (1914).
134. See generally Note, Panacea or Placebo? Actions For Negligent Noncompli-
ance Under The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1070, 1081-85 (1974).
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if he can demonstrate that false information was furnished with malice,
the existence of [the immunity] has done nothing to alter the con-
consumer's rights under common law." ''  This statement is not quite
accurate. If it were, the consumer information industry would probably
not have objected so strongly to the proposed deletion of this immunity
in the Proxmire amendments to the FCRA.138
The immunity does take away common law rights of consumers.
First of all, it takes away the very real right of consumers in Idaho and
Georgia to sue consumer reporting agencies for defamation without
having to prove malice, for these jurisdictions did not extend a qualified
privilege to consumer reporting agencies. 1117 Moreover, it denies to the
other jurisdictions the right to reverse their earlier common law rulings
that consumer reporting agencies are entitled to a qualified privilege.
More importantly, a cause of action for invasion of privacy has
never had a requirement for malice, except in those cases where pub-
licity is an element of the cause of action and a privilege may exist.138
Thus, the FCRA immunity establishes a general precondition for this
tort which never existed previously. This is particularly significant, for
nowhere in the FCRA is any limitation placed on the kind of informa-
tion that can be collected about a consumer or on the manner in which
such information can be collected. A consumer about whom highly
personal information was collected or about whom such information was
collected in a highly obnoxious manner might well have a cause of
action against the consumer reporting agency or the source of the infor-
mation for invasion of privacy, an intrusion upon his physical and
mental solitude.' 39  Yet, under current law, a consumer could not
maintain such an action without proving malice if he found out about
the intrusion under the disclosure provisions of the FCRA.
Finally, neither the FCRA nor the proposed CRAA create any
alternative civil liability for those who are the sources of information
contained in consumer reports. Both acts, of course, do have civil
liability provisions for consumer reporting agencies and users who
violate the acts. Therefore, a consumer's only remedies against those
135. FCRA Hearings, supra note 29, at 50 (memorandum of Francis M. Gregory,
Jr.) (emphasis in original).
136. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 92-95 (testimony of W. Lee Burge).
137. See note 133 supra.
138. See generally W. PRossna, LAw o ToRTs, § 117 (4th ed. 1971). This section
deals with the tort of invasion of privacy, and Prosser does not mention malice once.
He does point out in the succeeding chapter on the First Amendment privilege that that
privilege applies to invasion of privacy actions involving publicity, as well as to defama-
tion. Id. § 118, at 823.
139. This is one of the four kinds of invasion of privacy. Id. at 807-09. See gen-
erally Comment, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Constitutional Defects of the Limitation
of Liability Clause, 11 HousT. L. Rnv. 424, 431-39 (1974).
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who report false and defamatory information about him to consumer
reporting agencies are those he has at common law. Under the FCRA,
the immunity provision effectively blocks the use of these common law
remedies, though such would not be the case under the proposed
CRAA.
The consumer information industry supports the retention of the
immunity from common law actions because it permits a free and open
dialogue between consumers and consumer reporting agencies and
because it is thought to be unfair to compel consumer reporting agencies
to disclose the information in their files and then to subject them to
common law suits based on the disclosed information. 140 On the other
hand, it can be considered at least as unfair to take away a consumer's
common law remedies against consumer reporting agencies, users, and
sources of information simply because a consumer exercises his legiti-
mate right to learn what information about him is being collected and
distributed.
Expanded Control of Consumer Reporting Agencies
The previous two subsections described the major changes which
the CRAA would make in the FCRA. In addition to these, there are
a number of other changes of lesser importance contained in the act.
In general, these additional changes would expand the legal controls
governing the uses of consumer reports and the type of information
which can be included in them.
1. Distribution of Consumer Reports. The FCRA limits the per-
missible purposes of consumer reports and says one can be provided only
(1) in response to a court order, (2) in accordance with the written
instructions of the consumer, or (3) to a person who it is believed in-
tends to use the information in a credit transaction, for employment
purposes, in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving
the consumer, or for a government license for the consumer, or to a
person who "otherwise has a legitimate business need for the informa-
tion in connection with a business transaction involving the con-
sumer."'14  In addition, a consumer reporting agency may disclose
addresses and places of employment of consumers to a governmental
agency, but not a full consumer report.'42
The CRAA incorporates all of these and adds one more. It says
that a consumer report may be furnished in response to a lawful
subpoena of a governmental agency charged with enforcing the act. 143
140. S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 92-95 (testimony of W. Lee Burge).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970).
142. Id. § 1681f.
143. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.12(b).
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This provision was prompted by an adverse ruling of a federal district
court that under the FCRA a consumer reporting agency need not
furnish the FTC with subpoenaed files without a court order.144 How-
ever, since the CRAA does not create an agency to enforce it (apart
from the state attorney general), this provision would have no effect
until an agency was given this responsibility.
2. Market Research Not A Legitimate Business Purpose. The
CRAA specifically says that the furnishing of consumer reports for
market research or other marketing purposes is not a legitimate
business purpose for which a consumer report can be requested or
furnished. 145  This provision incorporates into the proposed California
law an interpretation to this effect of the FCRA by the FTC staff.1
46
3. Definition and Use of Obsolete Information. Under the FCRA
certain information, defined as obsolete, cannot be reported in a con-
sumer report except when it is for credit or insurance of $50,000 or
more or for employment when the annual salary is $20,000 or more. 4
Obsolete information includes bankruptcies older than fourteen years,
paid tax liens older than seven years, suits and judgments older than
seven years (or older than the governing statute of limitations which-
ever is longer), accounts placed for collection or written off older than
seven years, criminal justice records older than seven years, and any
other adverse information older than seven years.1 48
The proposed CRAA duplicates this section of the FCRA with
four modifications. First, the CRAA specifies ten years as the report-
able time period for unpaid judgments, as this is the statute of limita-
tions in California.149  Second, the CRAA mandates that certain
criminal justice records, in addition to being obsolete after seven years,
can no longer be reported, "if at any time it is learned that in the case
of a conviction a full pardon has been granted, or in the case of an
arrest, indictment, information, or misdemeanor complaint a conviction
did not result."'150 This is an important addition, designed to inhibit
the use of criminal records as adverse information against a consumer
when the consumer's presumption of innocence has not been overcome.
Third, to reflect inflationary increases the proposed CRAA raises the
threshold level for the reporting of obsolete information to $100,000
144. FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., Miami Branch Office, 357 F. Supp. 347
(D.D.C. 1973).
145. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.12(e)(1).
146. DrvisioN OF CONSUMER CRFDrr AN SPECIAL PROGRAMS, FTC, COMPLIANCE
WrrH THE FAro CREDrr REPORTING Acr 5 (2d ed. 1973).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b) (1970).
148. Id. § 1681c(a).
149. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.16(a)(3).
150. Id., proposed § 9998.16(a)(6).
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or more for insurance and $30,000 or more as the salary for employ-
ment.' 5 ' Fourth, the CRAA requires a consumer reporting agency
to keep the obsolete information in a separate file to insure that it is
not reported accidently when the transaction does not merit it.152
4. Special Controls on Public Information. The FCRA places
special controls on the dissemination of public record information (e.g.,
criminal records, suits, judgments) which may have an adverse impact
on a consumer's opportunity for employment. When such is the case,
a consumer reporting agency must either inform the consumer before
the report is given to the potential employer so he can verify the infor-
mation or maintain strict procedures to insure that the information is
up to date, meaning that the current status of the information is
reported. 153
The proposed CRAA modifies this section in four ways. 54 First,
it eliminates the option of informing the consumer before sending the
consumer report and simply mandates that strict procedures be main-
tained to insure that the information is current. In practice, this is what
the consumer reporting agencies have done under the FCRA. Second,
the CRAA makes these strict procedures applicable to all consumer
reports, not just to consumer reports used for employment purposes.
Third, it requires the identification of the court (if any) in which the
matter was determined or is pending. And fourth, the CRAA specifies
that the public information is current if it has been checked by the con-
sumer reporting agency within the past three months.
The purpose of these modifications is to extend the safeguard of
strict procedures on this potentially damaging information to all con-
sumer reports and to make more explicit what "current information"
is. The requirement that the court be identified is needed so that, for
example, a consumer whose report says simply that he has an unpaid
judgment outstanding will have some way to begin investigating the
matter. It should also be noted that the three month checking require-
ment will insure that a consumer reporting agency will recheck criminal
records frequently to determine whether a consumer has been par-
doned or not convicted in order to make sure that the criminal data
on that consumer is still reportable.' 55
5. Further Controls on Investigative Consumer Reports. Investi-
gative consumer reports, where the consumer reporting agency conducts
personal interviews with neighbors and associates to gather information,
are at the center of much of the controversy in the consumer informa-
151. Id., proposed § 9998.16(b).
152. Id., proposed § 9998.16(c).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1681k (1970).
154. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.28.
155. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
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tion field. It is here that questions about the relevancy and accuracy
of the information reported are most often raised. Investigative con-
sumer reports also raise serious privacy issues.
The FCRA places some special conditions on investigative con-
sumer reports. The user of such a report must disclose to the consumer
before or shortly after requesting one that such a report may be done.
The one exception to this rule is if the report is requested in connection
with employment for which the consumer has not specifically ap-
plied.'" The exception thus protects employers who do not wish an
employee to know he is being considered for a promotion. The user
must also inform the consumer of his right to additional disclosures,-"
and upon request, the user must disclose the nature and scope of the
investigation.'"
The proposed CRAA makes two changes in the current practice.
First, it limits investigative reports to those made for insurance, employ-
ment, or a business or professional license granted by a governmental
agency. 59 Investigative consumer reports would thus not be permitted
for a credit transaction. Second, disclosure to the consumer that an in-
vestigative report may be prepared would have to be made in all cases,
the only exception being an investigation of an employee for possible
criminal activity for which the employer may be liable. 60 Thus if an
employee is being considered for a promotion, an employer would have
to inform him if an investigative report might be prepared.
The purpose of these changes is to restrict the use of investigative
reports to those areas where they are absolutely necessary. Possibili-
ties of error and privacy considerations are much greater with investiga-
tive reports than with normal consumer reports. While it is possible
to see the relevancy of lifestyle information to a potential employer or
to an insurance underwriter, this is much less true for a financial institu-
tion making a loan. Furthermore, it is only fair that a consumer be
informed beforehand that such a report may be done so that he can
weigh the advantages of a job or insurance coverage against his privacy.
No doubt most consumers will agree to an investigative report as a pre-
condition, but nonetheless they should have the choice.' 6'
6. Maintaining List of Uses for Consumer Reports. The proposed
CRAA requires consumer reporting agencies to maintain a list of uses
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a)(2) (1970).
157. Id. § 1681d(a)(1).
158. Id. § 1681d(b).
159. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.18(a).
160. Id., proposed §§ 9998.18(c), (d).
161. See S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 626-27 (testimony of Arthur R.
Miller).
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which each user of the agency's consumer reports says are its purposes
for requesting the reports."6 2 There is no such provision in the FCRA.
However, this requirement, by insuring that only persons with a
legitimate purpose receive consumer reports, will aid in the enforce-
ment of the FCRA's criminal sanctions against illegal requests for or
disclosures of consumer reports.16
7. Exclusion of Department of Motor Vehicles from Category of
Consumer Reporting Agencies. The FTC staff has determined that,
under the provisions of the FCRA, a state motor vehicle department
is a consumer reporting agency if it makes its records available to the
general public. 64 For the purposes of the proposed CRAA, however,
the California Department of Motor Vehicles is excluded from the
definition of a consumer reporting agency. 65 This exclusion was no
doubt made to avoid creating a major institutional opponent to the legis-
lation and to permit the proponents of the bill to be able to say that
the bill has no fiscal implications for the state budget.
Federal Supremacy
The final section of the FCRA states:
[This Act] does not annul, alter, affect or exempt any person sub-
ject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the
laws of any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use
of any information on consumers, except to the extent that those
laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then
only to the extent of the inconsistency. 66
Thus it was the intent of Congress in passing the FCRA not to preempt
state law in this area.
Since the CRAA simply goes further than the FCRA in placing
requirements on consumer reporting agencies and users of consumer
reports and in providing for more disclosure and more remedies for
consumers, the provisions of the CRAA are supplemental to and not
inconsistent with the FCRA. The exclusion of the Department of
Motor Vehicles from the category of consumer reporting agencies
means simply that the department will not be subject to the more
stringent provisions of the CRAA but will remain a consumer reporting
agency as far as the FCRA is concerned. The federal grant of
immunity to consumer reporting agencies, users, and sources of infor-
mation from common law suits for negligence, defamation, and invasion
162. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.20(a).
163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681q-r (1970).
164. FTC Statements on General Policy or Interpretations Under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 16 C.F.R. § 600.4, 38 Fed. Reg. 4946 (1974).
165. A.B. 4494, supra note 45, proposed § 9998.2(e).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1970).
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of privacy might have been a problem except that the provision of the
FCRA specifically grants the immunity only when the consumer learns
of the information by means of the disclosure provisions of the
FCRA.167 Even now a consumer's common law remedies can be pre-
served if he files a common law suit against the consumer reporting
agency first and then obtains disclosure of the information in his file
by means of discovery procedures. 16 8 If the CRAA becomes law and
a California consumer has his file disclosed under the provisions of that
act, then the federal grant of immunity would have no application to
him.
Recognizing that an expanding amount of state legislation in this
field could greatly complicate compliance procedures for the consumer
information industry, the industry spokesmen at the Proxmire hearings
in 1973 made a strong plea to have federal legislation preempt the
states in this area.169 Since the bill with the proposed amendments to
the FCRA was tabled by the subcommittee, this request was never
acted upon.
Conclusion and Additional Proposals
The proposed CRAA is a valuable piece of legislation which, in
the author's opinion, creates a better and fairer balance between the
interests of the consumer and those of the consumer information
industry. The CRAA closes many of the loopholes in the FCRA, pro-
vides for more complete disclosure to the consumer of the information
about him being collected and sold, and, most importantly, creates
genuine remedies for the consumer about whom misinformation has
been reported. These remedies are important, for they would permit
effective private enforcement of the CRAA and would create strong
incentives for consumer reporting agencies and users to comply with
the act. The passage of this legislation would put California in the
forefront of consumer protection legislation in this area.
In some ways, however, the CRAA does not go far enough in pro-
tecting the consumer. Discussed briefly below are six areas where
additional legislative proposals might be considered.
1. Only Relevant Information Collected. As noted earlier,17 0
there is no provision in the FCRA nor in the proposed CRAA which
167. Id. § 1681h(e).
168. See S. 2360 Hearings, supra note 3, at 622 (testimony of Arthur R. Miller).
It is extremely unlikely, of course, that a consumer would follow this elaborate procedure
unless he were very familiar with the FCRA and had a strong suspicion that there was
defamatory information in his file.
169. Id. at 53 (testimony of John L. Spafford).
170. See text accompanying notes 138-39 supra.
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places any restriction on the kind of information which can be collected
and sold by a consumer reporting agency. Thus, the most personal kind
of information about a consumer can be collected and passed out in
consumer reports, even if the information is not relevant to the particu-
lar transaction. Some limitation on the information which can be col-
lected and reported, and thus some protection for the privacy of
consumers, would be afforded if there were a requirement that the
information be reasonably relevant to the purpose of the user. Such
a relevance test would force consumer reporting agencies and the users
of the reports to consider at least the purpose for which the information
is being collected. Furthermore, such a requirement of relevance
would permit the eventual development of common law standards of
what information is relevant to making decisions on different types of
transactions. In this way limits could be placed on the scope of the
information which can be collected on a consumer without the legisla-
ture needing to consider specific situations. As it stands, the consumer
information industry can collect virtually any kind of information it
wishes.
2. Additional Requirements on Users of Consumer Reports.
When a consumer is denied credit or insurance and is then referred to a
consumer reporting agency by the finance or insurance company, it is not
infrequent that the consumer learns there is no adverse information in
his file.'' A consumer in this situation can feel quite frustrated and
confused. This problem would be solved if finance and insurance
companies, the primary users of consumer reports, were required to tell
the consumer what it was in the consumer's application, the report from
the consumer reporting agency, or other information from a different
source (or lack of information) that was the cause of the denial of
credit or insurance. Compliance with a requirement like this would
not be difficult, for the consumer must be notified anyway that his
application has been denied, and adding the reason would not be a
great additional burden. It can be argued that financing and under-
writing decisions are the private business of these companies and that
an individual applicant has no right to know the details of the decision.
But when these companies rely strongly on the decisions of each other
in evaluating an application and are actively exchanging this informa-
tion with each other through the medium of consumer reporting
agencies, perhaps it is only fair that the consumer be told specifically
the reasons for the denial.
3. Advance Copy of Consumer Report for Employment. The ef-
fect of errors in a consumer report will differ greatly if the report has
been requested in connection with an application for employment rather
171. Feldman, supra note 26, at 472.
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than an application for credit or insurance. In the latter instances, the
user of the consumer report wants to do business with the consumer and,
generally, if misinformation is reported and later clarified, the con-
sumer may then be granted his application. But when a consumer has
been turned down for employment because of an erroneous report,
there is little likelihood that the job will still be available when the mis-
information is corrected. Moreover, the impact of a lost job is much
greater on a consumer than the denial of credit or insurance. Con-
sequently, it has been recommended that consumer reports which are
to be used for employment purposes be first sent to the consumer for
verification before they are seen by his potential employer.172 Impos-
ing this requirement, despite the increased costs and complications it
would entail, would give recognition to the importance of employment
and to the need for maximum accuracy in consumer reports for this
purpose.
4. Notification and Disclosure of In-House Investigative Reports.
It is possible for a consumer to learn that an investigative consumer re-
port has been made and to discover the contents of that report only if the
investigation was done by a consumer reporting agency. The defini-
tions in the FCRA and the proposed CRAA operate to exclude investi-
gations done by in-house staffs from the notification and disclosure re-
quirements of these acts. Consequently, if a large financial institution
or insurance company maintains its own staff of investigators, the con-
sumers who are the subjects of the investigations are afforded no legal
protections by these acts. As financial institutions and insurance com-
panies are already covered by the acts as users, it would be relatively
simple, and worthwhile from the consumer's standpoint, to extend the
protections of these acts to in-house investigations.
5. Credit Denials for Insufficient Information. Although the New
York statute covering consumer reporting agencies173 provides few pro-
tections for consumers, it does contain one interesting provision which
is worthy of consideration. This provision prohibits a consumer report-
ing agency from issuing a consumer report,
which lists a person as having been denied credit if the sole reason
for such denial is lack of sufficient information to grant credit
unless the report states that the denial was for such reason. 174
Thus, a consumer who is denied credit because of a meager credit his-
tory will not have his future credit opportunities impaired by a record
of credit denials which lack this explanation. A similar provision would
172. Id. at 478; Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 819, 840
(1972).
173. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 370-76 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
174. Id. § 372a.
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make a valuable addition to the CRAA. Its implementation could be
difficult, however, for the consumer reporting agencies and financial
institutions in California would need to modify their information
exchange system in order to distinguish denials of credit for insufficient
information from denials for other reasons. Since this is already a re-
quirement in New York, the procedures must exist and would only
need to be adapted to California.
6. Total Prohibition on Reporting Obsolete Information. Both
the FCRA and the proposed CRAA permit the reporting of old and
obsolete information for transactions involving certain minimum
amounts of money.1 75 There are two reasons why consideration should
be given to placing a total prohibition on the reporting of obsolete infor-
mation. First, it seems unfair that the moderately affluent cannot also
escape the impact of old adverse information on their search for credit,
insurance, or employment. They too should have the right to have
their pasts buried at some point. Second, the trend among consumer
reporting agencies is to computerize their operations. Unlike the tradi-
tional system of storing information on paper, where storage is inexpen-
sive but retrieval is costly, with computers the retrieval of information
is inexpensive but it is costly to store information. Consequently,
consumer reporting agencies which have computerized their operations
might well welcome a general restriction on reporting any obsolete in-
formation. If such a restriction were imposed then the size of their
files could be reduced and savings made without the fear of providing
a less complete information service than their competitors.
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175. See text accompanying notes 147-52 supra.
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